INTRODUCTION
Today, nearly all sectors of society depend on software systems to operate efficiently. As the dependency on software has grown, so have the threats towards these systems and the potential consequences of incidents. Though network security measures (such as firewalls and anti-virus software)canimprovethesecurityofthesoftwaresystems,theseonlyaddressthesymptomsofthe realproblem:softwarethatiscrippledwithvulnerabilities (McGraw,2006) .
Buildingsecurityintothesoftware,throughadoptingsoftwaresecurityactivitiesandmeasuresin thedevelopmentprocess,isadirectandeffectivewayofdealingwithcyberthreatstowardssoftware systems.This,however,addstothedevelopmenttimeandcost,andthisadditionneedstobejustified. Workingtowards100%securesystemsisnotfeasible,thusitisnecessarytoidentifywhichpartofthe softwareismorecriticalregardingsecurityandwhichactivitieswillbemostefficientandeffectivein securingthesoftwareproduct.Takingariskcentricapproachtosoftwaresecuritymeanstoidentify whatarethemajorrisksoftheparticularsoftwarethatisdeveloped,andusethisknowledgeofrisk toguidedecisionsregardingsoftwaresecurity.Thisiscommonlyrecommendedbycurrentsecure SoftwareDevelopmentLifecycles(SDLs),frameworksandmaturitymodels (Chandra,2008; Howard &Lipner,2006; McGraw,2006; McGrawetal.,2016) .
Inmanyways,securitycanbeconsideredtobeinconflictwiththecurrenttrendof"continuous development" (Fitzgerald&Stol,2017) ,reducingefficiencybydelayingdeliveryofnewfeatures (atleastintheshorterterm,thoughcostsmaybesavedthroughhavingtoprovidefewerfixeslater). Agilesoftwaredevelopmentusesaniterativeapproachtosoftwareconstruction,aimedatreducing developmenttime,andprioritisingvalue,whileimprovingsoftwarequalityandinherentlyreducing risk(CockburnandHighsmith2001).Itisclearthatpeopleissuesarethemostcriticalinagileprojects andthatthesemustbeaddressedifagileistobeimplementedsuccessfully (CockburnandHighsmith 2001) .Eventhoughagilemethodsclaimtoberiskdriven (Beck,2000; Eclipse,2016) ,someauthors haveobservedthatriskmanagementhasbeenneglectedinprojectmanagementofagileprojects (Hijazietal.,2012; Ibbs&Kwak,2000; Junioretal.,2012; Razetal.,2002) .Itmaybemoredifficult to establish a working process for software security activities in agile development compared to waterfall-baseddevelopment,whereyoucouldmoreeasilyhavemandatoryorrecommendedsecurity activitiesforthedifferentsoftwaredevelopmentphases (benOthmaneetal.,2014; Jaatunetal.,2015; Microsoft,2009 ).Oyetoyanetal.(2017 provideabriefoverviewofsecureSDLsandconcludethat traditional approaches to software security do not necessarily work well with agile development processes.Additionally,securityislargelyasystemicproperty,andwithagiledevelopmentitcanbe moreofachallengetohaveacompleteviewofthefinalsystem (benOthmaneetal.,2014) .Atthe sametime,agiledevelopmentmaycomewithsomeopportunitiesregardingsecurity,e.g.toadaptto newsecuritythreatsandtohaveongoinginteractionwithcustomersaboutsecurity. Riskcentricsoftwaresecurityisverymuchrelatedtothewaydevelopersaddresssecurityinthe projects.Still,otherrolesinanorganisation(e.g.procurers,legalexpertsandinformationsecurity experts)canhavemajorinfluencesonadevelopmentproject'sapproachtosecurityandcanhave importantpartstoplaywhenitcomestoidentifyingandunderstandingrisk,andinmakingriskbaseddecisionsintheprojects. Abouttenyearsago,vanWykandMcGraw(2005) The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of current research on risk managementinagiledevelopment.Section3describestheresearchmethodusedinthestudy.Section 4presentstheresultsofthestudy,whereastheimplicationsoftheseresultsarediscussedinSection 5,withanemphasisonmakingrecommendationsforresearchandpractice.Thethreatstovalidity arealsodiscussed.Section6concludesthepaper.
CURRENT STATE OF THE ART ON RISK CENTRIC SOFTwARE SECURITy
Inthissection,westartwithexplainingwhattypeofactivitieswewouldexpecttoseeinsoftware developmentifariskmanagementapproachistakentothesoftwaresecuritywork.Thenwemove ontopresentcurrentexperiencesonhowriskmanagementfitswiththeagileapproachtosoftware development.
Software Security Risk Management
Softwareprojectscomewithmanyuncertainties,includingtime-tomarket,stakeholderexpectations andbudget (Islametal.,2014) .Suchuncertaintiesleadtoprojectrisks.Softwareriskmanagement isatoolthatcanbeusedtomanageandreasonabouttheserisksinastructuredmanner.Islamet al.pointsoutthatdespitetheexistenceofseveralriskmanagementmethodsparticularlysuitedfor softwareprojects,currentresearchonsoftwareriskmanagementshowsthatthesearenotwellapplied. Practitioners' concern is the tangible development cost that lead to project deliverables and thus directbenefits.Theimpactofapplyinganoverallriskmanagementmethodonasoftwareprojectis unclear (Bannerman,2008 Risk analysis activities in software security are motivated by similar arguments as in ISO/ IEC 27005, Octave Allegro and RMF; to more effectively and less expensively identify security vulnerabilities and risks and establish mitigations (Howard & Lipner, 2006) , and to make better trade-off-decisionsandprioritisedevelopmenteffortsbasedonrisk (Chandra,2008; McGraw,2006) . Inaddition,theawarenessraisingamongprojectteams (Chandra,2008) isconsideredimportant, especiallywhenitcomestoimprovedunderstandingofwhatfactorsmayleadtonegativeoutcomes (Chandra,2008) andtheabilitytothinklikeanattacker (McGrawetal.,2016) .Threatmodellingis evenstatedtobe"The Cornerstone of the [Security Development Lifecycle] ,andthethreatmodel"the major [Security Development Lifecycle] artefact"that"must be used as a baseline for the product" (Microsoft,2009 Understandingandassessingsecurityriskisknowntobeacomplexchallenge.Arisk-based approach usually implies having an overview of the criticality of the various software assets, understandingpotentialthreatsandvulnerabilities(alsofromanattackerperspective)andbeingableto provideestimatesonlikelihoodandconsequencesofthedifferenttypesofincidentsthatcanharmthe softwareandimpacttheservicethesoftwaredeliverstoitsusers.Itisalsonecessarytounderstandhow thevariousriskscanbemitigatedeffectively.Riskanalysis,andespeciallyquantitativeriskanalysis, hasbeencharacterisedbysomeas"a modern fairytale"inthedomainofinformationsecurity,as thereisnooverviewofallthreatsandnotsufficientdatatoestimateprobabilityandconsequences. Tocompoundthechallenge,thereistypicallynotadequatemethodsupport (Oppliger,2015) .Ifthis isthecaseforinformationsecurity,itislikelyalsothecase(andmaybeevenmoreso)forsoftware security.Thereislimitedempiricaldataavailableonwhatmakesriskmanagementdifficult,both forinformationsecurityandsoftwaresecurity.AreviewofriskanalysismethodsforITsystems (Sulamanetal.,2013)identifiedalackofevaluationofriskanalysismethods.Despitethemantra thatallsecurityworkshouldberiskbased,astudyamonginformationsecurityprofessionals (Jourdan etal.,2010) unveiledthatasmanyas25%statedthatriskanalysiswasneverorrarelyperformedfor theirdepartmentororganisation.Amainchallengethathasbeenidentifiedregardinginformation securityriskassessmentsistheestimationoflikelihoodandcostofinformationsecurityrisks,due inparttolimitedhistoricaldataavailableandconstantlychangingriskfactors (Cybenko,2006; Fenz &Ekelhart,2010; Gerber&VonSolms,2005; Rheeetal.,2012; Tøndeletal.,2015) .Information isanintangibleassetwhereitis"extremelydifficultifnotimpossibletodetermineprecisevalue" (Gerber&VonSolms,2005) ,andmanylossesareneverdiscoveredandreported(Rheeetal.,2012).
Software Security Risk Management in Agile Development
Riskmanagementcanbesaidtobetreatedimplicitlyinagiledevelopmentprojects (Odzalyetal., 2017; Tavaresetal.,2017 ).AsexplainedbyNelsonetal.(2008 ,onesuchimplicitriskmanagement technique is to prioritise tasks in the beginning of the iteration. As such, high-risk tasks can be prioritised, something that can reduce overall project risk. But as Nelson et al. point out, risk managementisbroaderthanprioritisinghigh-risktasks.Thereisaneedtofollowupontheriskand takeadditionalactionsifnecessary.
Astheguidanceprovidedbyagilemethodswhenitcomestoriskmanagementcanbesaidto be"verygeneral" (Nyfjord&Kajko-Mattsson,2008) ,researchhasaimedtotailorriskmanagement toagiledevelopmentprojects,withseveralapproachesbeingsuggested (Odzalyetal.,2017) .Few studieshavehowevercoveredintegrationofriskmanagementwithagilesoftware,consideringthe organisationallevel (Nyfjord&Kajko-Mattsson,2008; Odzalyetal.,2017) .
Onsecurityriskmanagementforagileprojects,theresearchpapersareevenfewer.Therearefew studiesonpractices,andfewriskanalysismethodsspecificallytailoredtowardsagiledevelopment. OneofthemorerelevantstudiesavailableisanactionresearchstudyatEricsson, (Bacaetal.,2015) oftheeffectsofimplementingasecurityenhancedagilesoftwaredevelopmentprocess(SEAP).This processincludedseveralsoftwaresecurityactivities(e.g.codereview,penetrationtesting),however thestudyfocusessolelyontwokeyaspectsofSEAP:Addingmoresecurityresourcesintheproject andthedevelopmentteams,andperformingincrementalriskanalysis.TheintroductionofSEAP 
RESEARCH METHOD
Thissectiongivesanoverviewoftheresearchmethodusedforthestudy.Itstartswithdescribingthe studygoalandstudydesign,explaininghowthestudyconsistsofthreeseparatesub-studies.Then itmovesontoexplainingthesub-studiesinmoredetail,beforedescribingtheapproachtoanalysis.
Research Questions and Study Design
Thisstudyisacombinationofthreeindividualstudies(sub-studies)thathavebeenperformedoverthe spanoftwoyearsandthataddressacommontheme.Overall,thestudyismotivatedbythevitalrolea riskcentricapproachisconsideredtohaveintheliteraturewhenitcomestoachievingcosteffective softwaresecurityandittacklestheresearchquestion"Howcancurrentsoftwareorganisationswork withsoftwaresecurityinariskcentricway?"Figure1showshowthethreeindividualsub-studies togetheraddressthisresearchquestionfromthreedifferentangles.Thefirstsub-studystudiedsoftware securityaspartoftheoverallinformationsecuritymanagementpracticesintheorganisations,from theviewpointofpeopleworkingoninformationsecurity.Byhavingthisasthefirstsub-studywe wereabletogetahigh-levelviewoftheoverallchallengesandstatusonanorganisationallevel. However, this sub-study deliberately ignored the developer viewpoint, and thus missed a central perspectiveonthetopicstudied.Thus,inthesecondsub-studywestudiedtwohigh-profilepublic developmentprojectsinmoredetail,aimingtogetanunderstandingofhowsecuritywashandledin theprojects.Together,sub-studyoneandsub-studytwogaveanoverviewofpracticesandchallenges relatedtosoftwaresecurityfromboththeviewpointofsecuritypeopleandsoftwarearchitectsin thedevelopmentprojectsbutlackedamorestructuredoverviewofthesoftwaresecurityactivities adoptedintheorganisations.Assuch,sub-studythreeaimedtogetsuchanoverviewbymappingtheir softwaresecurityactivitiestothosedescribedintheBSIMMframework (McGrawetal.,2016) .The threesub-studiestogethermadeusabletoidentifyandmapriskcentricactivitiesandpracticesinthe organisationsandunderstandchallengesofimplementingariskcentricapproachtosoftwaresecurity.
Asexplainedintheintroduction,thedecisiontostudydevelopmentintheNorwegianpublic sectorwasmadebasedonthreefactors:asecuritypushinthissectorhadforcedthemtoprioritise security management in the organisations, legal expertise in the organisations made them aware of any compliance requirements on security, and we had easy access to study participants. The AgencyforPublicManagementandeGovernment(Difi)wasourpartnerintwoofthesub-studies (sub-study1and3),contributingwithfinancingaswellashelpinginparticipantrecruitment.This madeitpossibletogetaccesstoahighnumberoforganisationswithinasectorwheresecuritywas receivinggrowingattention.
Table2givesanoverviewofkeyfactsaboutthesub-studies.Ascanbeseenthefullstudyhas beenperformedoveraperiodoftwoyears.Assomeorganisationsparticipatedinmorethanonesubstudy,thetotalnumberofpublicorganisationsstudiedis23,inadditiontotwosoftwarecompanies (consultants/contractors)thathadacentralroleinpublicsoftwaredevelopmentprojects. Tworesearchersfacilitatedallthefocusgroups.Oneofthesewasresponsiblefortakingdetailed notes from the discussion. In addition, all conversations were recorded. After each focus group, theresearchersreflectedabouthowthegroupsfunctioned;whethereverybodyparticipatedinthe discussion, if they agreed a lot or disagreed. Observations regarding group dynamics have been takenintoaccountintheanalysisoftheresults,inadditiontoothercontextinformationregarding backgroundandexperiencesofparticipantsandmaturityoftheirorganisations.Aftereachfocus group,asummarywasmadeandsenttotheparticipantsforcomments.Thesummaryincludeda recapitulationofthemostinterestingpointsofthediscussion,aswellasunstructuredandanonymised notesfromthediscussion.
Sub-Study 2: Architecture and Security in Large Agile Development Projects (DP A and DP B)
Inthesecondsub-study,oneverylargeagileprojectwasselectedastheprimarycasetostudy.Inthe followingwecallthisproject"DevelopmentprojectA".Thisprojectranforfouryearsandconsumed roughly800000man-hoursandwasamongthelargestagilesoftwareprojectsinNorwayatthattime. Intotalthreeorganisationswereinvolvedinthedevelopment,thiswasthepublicorganisationitself andtwocontractororganisations.Formoredetailsonthiscaseandthestudydesignsee (Dingsøyr etal.,2017) .
Inthissub-study,weperformedinterviewsonhowarchitectureandsecuritywashandledin theproject.Weorganisedthreegroupinterviews,oneforeachorganisation.Thereasonforhaving onlyoneorganisationineachinterviewwasthatwewantedtocapturepotentialdifferencesbetween the organisations. Participants to the group interviews were recruited to the study by asking the involvedorganisationstoinvitethemostrelevantpeopleforthetopic.Forthegroupinterviewson softwarearchitectureandsecurityonlyoneofthecontractorswasabletoparticipatewithpersonnel thathadworkedontheDevelopmentprojectA,resultingintwogroupinterviewsonthistopic.In totalsixpersonsfromtheprojectparticipatedinthesetwointerviews;threepersonsfromthepublic organisationandthreefromoneofthecontractors.Allthesehadservedinsoftwarearchitectroles atsometimeduringtheproject,rangingfromteamarchitecttochiefarchitect.Theinterviewswere performedbytworesearchers,recordedandtranscribed.
ThecontractorthatcouldnotparticipatewithpersonnelfromDevelopmentprojectA,instead participatedinthestudywithoneexperiencedsoftwarearchitectthatwasresponsibleforanother high-profilepublicdevelopmentproject.Inthefollowingwecallthisproject"Developmentproject B".ThisagileprojectwasconsiderablysmallerthanDevelopmentprojectA,withonlytwoteams andonecontractor,andoneyearofdevelopment.However,thisprojecthadaconsiderablyhigher focusonsecurityissues,duetothesensitivityofthedatahandled.
Sub-Study 3: Software Security Maturity (swsec Maturity)
Thethirdsub-studywasperformedaboutoneandahalfyearsaftertheothertwosub-studies,andwas aimedatmeasuringthesoftwaresecuritymaturityamongNorwegianpublicorganisations (Jaatun etal.,2015) .ThestudyinstrumentconsistedofaquestionnairebasedontheBuildingSecurityIn MaturityModel(BSIMM)asdocumentedintheBSIMMVreport (McGrawetal.,2013 (Jaatun etal.,2015) .Inthispaper,wehavealsoanalysedthenotesfromthefollow-upinterviews,anduse thesetoshedmorelightonthequestionnaireresponsesandthesoftwaresecuritypracticesreported.
Analysis
The three studies were aimed at identifying existing practices and challenges when it comes to softwaresecurityintheseorganisations.Tounderstandthesepracticesandchallenges,wecodedthe databasedontheassumptionthatriskmanagementisakeytomakingdecisionsregardingsoftware security,asdepictedinFigure1.TheoverallprocessofanalysisisillustratedinFigure2.Forthe analysis,weusedMindManager,withoneseparatemindmapforeachstudy.Toeasecomparisonof datafromthedifferentstudies,theoverallstructureofeachmindmapwasthesame:riskassessment, risktreatmentdecisions,riskmonitoring,riskcommunication.Thenthedatawithineachofthese overalltopicswasorganisedintocategoriesbasedonthecoding.Aftercodingandcreatingamind mapforeachsub-study,keyfindingsfromeachofthecategoriesandforeachstudywereidentified, andthesewereagainusedtoorganisethedataintoamindmapthatincludedthekeyfindingsand datafromallthestudies,andanalysethesetogether.
RESULTS
Inthissection,wegiveanoverviewofpracticesandexperiencesfromtheorganisationsandprojects studiedwhenitcomestoriskanalysis,risktreatmentdecisions,risktreatmentfollowupandrisk communication.Thenweprovideanoverviewoftriggersandbarriersnotdirectlyrelatedtorisk managementthatseemtobeimportantforsoftwaresecurityinthestudiedorganisations.
Practice Adoption
Table3givesanoverviewofthemainfindingsonadoptionofriskcentricpracticesinthestudied organisations.Thestateofadoptionissummarisedinthefindings-columnwithanumber.Themeaning ofthisnumberdiffersbetweenthesub-studies.Forsub-study2(DPAandDPB)theadoptionis relatedtoanindividualproject,andshowsiftheprojectadoptsthepracticethroughouttheproject (2),adoptsthepracticetosomeextent(e.g.doesitinanad-hocmannerorpartially)(1)ordoesnot adoptthepractice(0).Forsub-study1(ISn&p)andsub-study3(swsecmat)thepracticeadoption relatestoorganisations,notprojects,andthenumberassigneddependsonthepracticesofthestudied organisationsoverall.Thus,apracticeissaidtobeadopted(2)ifmostoftheorganisations(80%or Intheorganisationsstudied,thestrongestdriverwefoundforperformingriskanalysisrelated to security is legal requirements (RA2). In the swsec maturity study (sub-study 3), three of the organisationsreferredtolegalrequirementswhentheytalkedabouttheirriskassessmentpractices, andoneclearlystatedthatanauditwasthetriggerforperformingriskassessments.Othermotivations arenotexpressedtothesameextentbytheintervieweesinthissub-study.Inthedevelopmentprojects studied(sub-study2)thiseffectoflegalrequirementsisshowninpractice.DevelopmentprojectBis theonlyoneofthetwowithclearlegalrequirementsonsecurity,andtheonlyonewhereriskanalysis wasdoneregularlythroughouttheproject.AlthoughdevelopmentprojectAwashighprofile,security riskswerenotsystematicallyanalysedintheproject,andthesoftwarearchitectswetalkedtodidnot seemtobeparticularlyconcernedabout,norupdatedon,thesecurityofthesystem.
Risk treatment decisions are often not made based on a process that ensures a thorough understandingofrisk.Intheorganisationsstudieditseemsabitarbitrarywhetherornotsecurity isconsideredfortheprojects(RTD1).Althoughsomesecurityissuesmaybeconsideredearlyon, importantsecurityissuesmaystillbeleftout.Securityisinmanycasesincludedabitlateandinclusion iserror-driven.Inthedevelopmentprojectsstudiedthisisespeciallythecaseindevelopmentproject A,wheresecurityissuesthatwereaccidentallydiscoveredwasamainreasonforthesecurityefforts thattheintervieweestoldusabout.Some"surprises"arehoweverhardtoavoid,andthiswasalso thecaseindevelopmentprojectB(wheresecuritywasconsideredthroughouttheproject)wherethe intervieweestatedthat"…wetooksomemeasurestowardstheend,whereitdidjuststrikeus'oh, wejusthavetosecurethis.'"Inthisproject,however,mostsecuritymeasureswereinitiatedinamore plannedandproactiveway.Allsub-studiesagreethatsoftwarearchitectshaveapotentiallyimportant rolewhenitcomestosecurityintheprojects,butthisisdependentontheirpersonalinitiativeand interestinsecurity.Inpractice,fewsoftwarearchitectsseemtohavesecurityasamaininterest,and theirexplicitresponsibilitieswhenitcomestosecurityarelimited.Securitypeoplearesometimes 
Triggers and Barriers for Software Security
Ascanbeobservedfromtheresultsdescribedintheabovesubsection,theresultsfromthisstudy downplaytheimportanceofriskanalysisincurrentsoftwaresecuritypracticesinmanyofthese organisations. It is suggested that any risk analysis performed is often not relevant, and that the motivationismainlylegalcomplianceandnotimprovedsecurityperse.Additionally,riskanalysis isnotputforwardasanimportantbasisformakingdecisionsaboutwhatsecuritymeasuresand activities are needed in the projects. Follow-up of any such decisions is also not risk-based, and veryfewhaveanyclearprocessestoreviewandtestforsecurityissuesandensurethatanysecurity requirementsareadequatelydealtwithinthefinalsoftware.AscanbeseeninTable3,adoptionof typicalriskmanagementactivities(asdescribedinsection2.1)islow,exceptindevelopmentproject B.Althoughthesoftwaresecurityapproachoftheseorganisationsdoesnotseemtoberiskcentric, theydoreportthattheyperformanumberofsecurityactivities,ascanbeseeninFigure3thatgives anoverviewofthequestionnaireresponsesintheswsecmaturitysub-study(formoredetailsonthese responses,see (Jaatunetal.,2015) . Asriskmanagementdoesnotseemtobethemostimportantstartingpointforsoftwaresecurity inthestudiedorganisations,wehaveidentifiedfromthedataotheractivitiesorfactorsthatarestated aspossibletriggersorbarriersforsoftwaresecuritybytheinterviewees(seeTable4).Thesehave beenidentifiedbygoingthroughthecodeddatalookingforwhatintervieweesdescribeascauses fororhindrancesforsoftwaresecurityintheirorganisationsandprojects.
Asdescribedintheprevioussub-section,externalrequirementsclearlyrepresentatriggerfor performingriskanalysis,andtheyimpactthesecurityrequirementsofprojectsaswellastheeffort putintosecurity.DevelopmentprojectBhadquitestrictlegalrequirementsrelatedtothedatathe productwastohandle,andthisislikelythemajorreasonwhythisprojecthadarelativelystrong focusonsecurity.Additionally,theinformationsecuritypeoplewetalkedtointheISn&psub-study (sub-study1)alsosawcloserinteractionwiththelegaldepartmentasapossiblewaytopushmore securitytotheprojects.
Asalsomentionedintheprevioussub-section,detectionofsecurity-relatederrorsmadeincode clearlytriggersaburstinsecurityattentioninordertofixdiscoveredissues.Hearingaboutsecurity problemsinpreviousprojectscanalsoincreasegeneralattentionaboutsecurity.However,whenit comestoissuesrelatedtoriskperceptionandattitudeandcompetenceonsecurity,awarenessseems tobelowinthemajorityoftheprojectsintheseorganisations.Oneofthereasonsstatedforthis isthatmanyofthesystemstheydeveloparemeantonlyforinternaluseandwillnotbedirectly accessiblefromtheinternet.Andtheystatethatincaseswheretheydevelopopensystems,these oftenonlypresentdatathatisconsideredopenaswell,thussecurityisnotconsideredimportant.The exceptiontothisamongtheprojectswehavestudiedisdevelopmentprojectB(sub-study2),where theresultingprojectwastobeaccessiblefromtheinternetandcontainedsensitivedata,andinthis case,securitywasmadeapriority.Inthestudy,wehavenotmadeanyeffortstoidentifysecurity riskstothesoftwaretheorganisationsdevelop,inordertoverifysuchclaims.However,itisworth notingthatthesecurityexpertsintheISn&psub-studystatedthatawarenessabouttheconfidentiality aspectsofsecurityismuchhigherthanawarenessaboutintegrityandavailabilityaspects.Thesame information security people additionally experienced that knowledge of security was low among manyofthedevelopersandprocurers,whoconsidersecuritytomainlybeatechnicalissuethatwill automaticallybecovered.Still,theoverallstudyalsogivesindicationsthatknowledgeaboutsecurity isimprovingamongdevelopers,assomeofthepeoplewetalkedwithintheswsecmaturitystudy (sub-study3)perceiveddevelopersasknowledgeableaboutsecurity.Furthermore,althoughitseems thatinterestinsecurityamongsoftwarearchitectsanddevelopersmaybeabitlowbasedonthedata wehave,italsoshowsthatsecuritycanbeperceivedassomethingthatmakesaprojectinteresting andchallengingfromatechnicalviewpoint.
Intheorganisationswehavestudied,theresponsibilityforsoftwaresecurityseemsunclearand fragmented.Fewcanreallyclaimtohaveasoftwaresecuritygroup(SSG),i.e.,agroupthatincludes rolessuchassecurityarchitectorsecuritytester.Inmanyorganisations,theresponsibilityforsoftware securityisconsideredpartoftheresponsibilityforinformationsecurity,butinthatcase,itrunsthe riskofgettingdeprecated.Someoftheinformantswereclearthatintheirorganisationothersecurity activities and goals had been prioritised, and consequently software security had not been given attention.Architectsareseenaspotentialalliesinasecuritypush,butasofnowtheyseldomhave explicitresponsibilityforsecurity.Byandlarge,itiscurrentlynotpossibletoclearlyholdanyone accountableforsoftwaresecurity.
Whenchangesneedtobemadethroughouttheproject,securityisnotnecessarilyconsidered. Moreoftenthannot,timepressureintheprojectsresultsinsecurityrequirementsbeingdeprecated inordertoreachotherprojectgoals.Thisisconsideredabiggerproblemwithagiledevelopment thaninmoretraditionalwaterfall-baseddevelopmentmodels.
DISCUSSION
Basedontheresultsofthesestudieswehaveidentifiedthreemainareasthatisimportanttoconsider inordertoimprovecurrentpracticeandtoguidefurtherresearch.Theseare:responsibilitiesand stakeholdercooperation;riskperceptionandcompetence,and;practicalwaysofdoingriskanalysis. Involvementcanbedoneandsupportedinmanyways,e.g.throughroutinesandbycreating meetingplaces.Inanycase,itisimportanttoensurethevoicesoflegalexperts,securityexperts, andpotentiallyothertypesofstakeholdersrelatedtosecurity,isheardatkeydecisionpointsinthe projectstoensurethatalsotheirconcernsaretakenintoaccountinthedecisionsonwhatriskshould beaccepted.Trade-offswillhavetobemade,butthesetrade-offsshouldbemadebasedonawareness ofthepotentialconsequencesofthechoicesavailabletotheproject.
Risk Perception and Competence
Intheorganisationsstudied,itseemsclearthatconfidentialityiswhatismainlyconsideredwhen thinkingabouttheneedsforsecurityintheprojects.Wefoundlittleawarenessinthedatathatsecurity isalsoaboutintegrityandavailability.AscanbeseenfromTable6,manyoftheobstacleswhenit comestosoftwaresecurityintheorganisationsisrelatedtoriskawareness;stakeholdershavethe opinionthatsecurityisnotneededbecausethesystemsareonlytobeusedinternallyoronlycontain opendata.Theseareclearlyfactorsthatreducetherisk.However,itshouldnotautomaticallyleadto theconclusionthatthereisnoneedtoconsidersecurityforsuchsystems.Somesecuritybreachesare performedbyinsiders(Jang-Jaccard&Nepal,2014).Somesystemsthatstartoutasinternal,arelater wrappedtohaveawebinterfaceetc.Opendatamayhaverequirementswhenitcomestointegrityand availability.Inaddition,systemsthatonlyprocessopenorotherwiseinsensitivedatamightstillbe usedasastepinanattack,whicheventuallygainsaccesstoothersystemsinthecompany.Thus,the organisationsneedtoconsiderabroadersetofsecuritypropertiesintheirevaluationsofsecurityneeds. Toimprovesecurityawareness,thereisaneedtodosomethingaboutthecurrentlackoftraining in software security among all stakeholders that are somehow involved in development, it being developers,softwarearchitectsorprocurers.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatalldevelopersmust attend a software security course (though this will surely have its benefits). Participation in risk analysisisanexcellentwayofincreasingbothsecurityknowledgeandawareness (Wheeler,2011) . EvaluationsofProtectionPoker(Williamsetal.,2010)showthatusingacollaborativetechnique fordiscussingsoftwaresecurityrisksinthewholeteamraisesawarenessonsecurityandspreads knowledgeonsecuritywithintheteam.ThiscorrespondstotheexperiencesreportedbyKongsli (Kongsli,2006) 
Practical ways of Doing Risk Analysis
Intheorganisationsandprojectsstudied,theworkonsoftwaresecuritydoesnotseemtoberiskcentric, withafewexceptions(developmentprojectB(sub-study2)andpossiblyafewoftheorganisations intheswsecmaturitysub-study(sub-study3)).Instead,organisationstakeamorecompliance-based approachtosecurity,withlegalrequirementsasamaindriverforsecurityrequirementsandrisk assessments.Acompliance-basedapproachcomeswithitsbenefits,aswasalsodiscussedintheIS n&psub-study(sub-study1)inthecontextoforganisationalsecuritywork(notsoftwaresecurity). Ingeneral,theparticipantsinthefocusgroupsdidnotagreeonwhatwouldbemostbeneficial;arisk basedoracompliance-basedapproachtoinformationsecurity.Itwaspointedoutthatarisk-based approachrequiresmorecompetenceinordertobeconfidentthatmajorrisksaretakencareof.In caseswheresuchcompetenceislacking,achecklist-basedapproachoranapproachthatmainlyis basedonlegalrequirementsmayresultinbettersecurity.Legalrequirementscanthenbeconsidered aspecificationofaminimumsecuritylevelthatallorganisationshavetocomplywith. Although a compliance-based approach is easier to apply, a large amount of literature and standards recommend the risk centric approach (Caralli et al., 2007; Chandra, 2008; Howard & Lipner,2006; ISO/IEC,2011; McGraw,2006; McGrawetal.,2016; NIST,2010; Wheeler,2011) . Wewouldliketopointoutthreemaindisadvantageswithacompliance-basedapproachtosecurity (basedonWheeler(2011) 
Threats to Validity
ThediscussionofthreatstovalidityofthisstudyisbasedontherecommendationsofCruzesandben Othmaneregardingthreatstovalidityinempiricalsoftwaresecurityresearch (Cruzes&benOthmane, 2017) .Itisimportanttohighlightthatqualitativestudiessuchastheonethatweperformedrarely attempt to make universal generalisations. Instead, they are more concerned with characterising, explaining,andunderstandingthephenomenainthecontextsunderstudy.CruzesandbenOthmane basetheirrecommendationsonLincolnandGuba (1985) ,thatsubstitutedreliabilityandvaliditywith theparallelconceptoftrustworthiness.Trustworthinessagainconsistsoffouraspects:credibility, transferability,dependability,andconfirmability,withcredibilityasananalogytointernalvalidity, andtransferabilityasananalogytoexternalvalidity.
Credibilityrefersto"thequalityofbeingconvincingorbelievable,worthyoftrust"(Cruzes&ben Othmane,2017),anddependabilityrefersto"stabilityandreliabilityofdataovertimeandconditions" (Cruzes&benOthmane,2017) .Thecredibilityanddependabilityofthisstudyarecloselyrelated,and highlylinkedtostudydesigndecisions,inparticulardecisionsregardingscopeanddepthofthestudy. Inthefollowingwediscussthreemaindesigndecisionsmadeandtheirimpactonvalidity,namely thedecisiontostudyseveralorganisationsatahighlevelinsteadofoneorafeworganisationsata moredetailedlevel,thedecisiontogathertheperspectivesofrolesoutsidethedevelopmentteams, andthedecisiontohavethestudyorganisedasthreesub-studiesspanningtwoyears.
Inthisstudy,wehavestudied23organisations,butthesehavenotbeenstudiedindetail.We relyonself-reportingofpractices,andthusonthepeoplewetalkwithadequatelyreportingboth practices and challenges. In the focus groups as well as in the interviews we got the impression thatthepeoplewetalkedtowerehonestabouttheirpractices,alsotellingaboutchallengesthey faced.However,wehavenotaimedtocheckthatwhattheytolduswasinfacttrueusingadditional empiricalsources.Usually,onlyonepersonfromeachorganisationwasinterviewed,thusweonly gotoneindividual'sperspectiveontheirsoftwaresecuritywork.Wecouldhavechosentogomore indepthintheorganisations,includingmorepeoples'perspectives,butthiswouldhavecomeatthe costofthenumberoforganisationswewouldhavethecapacitytostudy.Studyingasmanyas23 organisationsfromthesamesectormakesusabletounderstandthepracticesandchallengesofthis sectorasawhole,notonlythatofindividualorganisations.
IntheISn&psub-study(sub-study1)andintheswsecmaturitysub-study(sub-study3),most ofthepeoplewetalkedtowerenotdeeplyinvolvedindevelopment,butratherhadrolesrelated tonetworksecurityorinformationsecurityintheorganisation.Onereasonforthisstudydesign decision is our research question, where we take a more holistic approach to understanding risk centricpracticestosoftwaresecurity,includingalsotheorganisationalaspect.Thisemphasisonthe opinionsofsecuritypeopleoutsideofthedevelopmentprojectsishoweveralimitation,aswemay risktonotadequatelyunderstandtheactualpracticesofthedevelopmentprojects.Bystudyingtwo developmentprojectsinmoredetail,weovercomesomeofthislimitation.However,itisimportant tonotethatbycollectingtheviewpointsofsecuritypeople,alsooutsidedevelopment,isimportant becauseitcorrespondstothewaysoftwaresecurityiscurrentlyhandledintheseorganisations.When intheswsecmaturitysub-studyweaskedtotalkwiththoseresponsibleforsoftwaresecurity,wewere directedtoinformationsecuritypeopleinmanycases.Ifwehaddecidedtoonlystudytheprojects, wewouldhavemissedtheimportantperspectiveofthesecuritypeopleandtheirinteractionwiththe projectswhenitcomestosoftwaresecurity.
Thestudyperformedinordertodothismappingconsistsofthreesub-studiesperformedovertwo years.Thestudydoesnotaimtoidentifychangesthatmayhavehappenedduringthistime.However, wearenotawareofanymajorexternalfactorsthatwouldimpactthesoftwaresecurityworkduring thesetwoyears.Thefocusinthethreesub-studiesarenotthesamebutdifferinwhatisstudiedand whoisusedasinformants.Thisisastrengthinthewaythatthesoftwaresecuritypracticesinthesector isstudiedfromdifferentangles.However,noneofthestudiesstudyriskcentricactivitiesexclusively. Rather,theoverallpracticesandchallengesareaimedcaptured.Aswedidnotbringwithusalist ofriskcentricactivitiestolookforinthecompanies,wemayhavemissedsomeoftheirriskcentric activities.However,studyingtheorganisationsstrictlythroughthelensofsuchalistofriskcentric activitiescouldresultinoverlookingpracticesthatwehadnotincludedinthelistbeforehand,thus obscuringtheorganisations'practicesandapproachtosoftwaresecurity.
Transferabilityofstudyresultsrefersto"thedegreetowhichtheresultsofthequalitativeresearch canbegeneralizedortransferredtoothercontextsorsettings.Itdependsonthedegreeofsimilarity between sending and receiving contexts" (Cruzes & ben Othmane, 2017) . In this case, it should notbedonewithouttakingintoaccounttheparticularcontextofthisstudy;publicorganisationsin Norway.Publicorganisationsmaybehavedifferentlythanprivatesoftwarecompaniesinsomerespects. Althoughprivatecompaniesactascontractorstothestudiedpublicorganisations,theorganisations themselveshavedifferentgoalsthanwhatiscommonforprivatecompanies.Thehighemphasison legalcompliancefoundinthisstudyisanexampleofafactorthatcanbestrongerbecauseofthe sectorandthetypeofsystemsdeveloped.However,withtheupcomingenforcementoftheGeneral DataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)legalcompliancewillmostlikelybecomemoreimportantfor softwarecompaniesingeneral.
Confirmability refers to "neutrality; that is, findings must reflect the participants' voice and conditionsoftheinquiry,andNOTtheresearcher'sbias,perspective,ormotivations"(Cruzes&ben Othmane,2017).Inthethreesub-studies,severalresearchershavebeeninvolvedindatacollection, andnooneresearcherhastakenpartinalldatacollection.Thisisbothastrengthandaweakness.By havingseveralresearchersinvolved,anypreconceptionsofoneindividualresearcherhavelessimpact onthedatacollection.However,withseveralresearchersinvolvedthereisthechallengeofcoordinating theseresearcherstoensurethedatacollectionisconsistentamongthedifferentcompanies.Thiswas especiallyimportantintheswsecmaturitysub-study,wherephoneinterviewsweredonebyseveral researchersindividually,andinthissub-studywetookmeasurestoensuretheinvolvedresearchers hadasimilarunderstandingofkeyconceptsusedintheinterviewguideandofthegoalofthestudy. Intheothertwosub-studies,datacollectionwasdonebythesameresearchersthroughoutthewhole sub-study.Richnessofdatahasbeenensuredthroughrecordingofinterviewsinsub-studies1and2.In sub-study2,thedataanalysedwasthetranscribedinterviews,whileinsub-study2therecordingwas usedtoenrichnotestakenduringthefocusgroupsessions.Thesenotes,includinginitialconclusions fromthefocusgroup,wassenttothefocusgroupmembersforcommentsashorttimeafterthefocus group.Insub-study3,richnessofdatawasensuredbyhavingquestionnairesthatwasfollowedup byaninterview.Besides,wehavecreatedmind-mapsofthedataforabstractionoftheresults,where allresultscanbetracedbacktotheoriginalsourceofinformation.
CONCLUSION
Thisstudyofsoftwaresecuritypracticesinpublicorganisations,withamappingoftheirriskcentric activities,hasrevealedthatsoftwaresecuritypracticeswerenotmainlybasedonanassessmentof softwaresecurityrisks,butratherdrivenbycompliance.Theirpracticescouldalsoinmanycases becharacterisedasarbitrary,lateanderrordriven,withlimitedfollowuponanysecurityissues throughoutthedevelopmentprojects.Wehaveidentifiedaneedfor:morepracticalwaysofdoing riskanalysis;improvedriskperceptionandcompetence;andclearerresponsibilitiesandimproved stakeholdercooperation.
We recommend that organisations move towards a more risk centric approach to software security,asthecurrentcompliance-basedapproachdoesnotgiveadequateconfidencethatimportant securityissuesareaddressedsufficiently.Indoingthis,organisationswouldbenefitfromlightweight processesfordeterminingtheneedforsecurityinaproject,makingsurethefullsecurityproperties areconsidered.Additionally,thereisaneedforriskanalysismethodsthatfitagilesoftwareprojects, andthatcanbedoneinamorecontinuousmanner.Keystakeholdersinthedevelopmentproject shouldbeinvolvedinriskanalysis,toincreaseawarenessofsecurity.Responsibilityforsoftware securityinaprojectshouldbeclearlyassigned,andshouldpreferablybegiventosomeoneclose tothedevelopment.However,inadditiontoassigningresponsibility,thereisaneedtoarrangefor legalandsecurityexpertstohaveunderstandingofandinteractionwithdevelopmentprojects.When decisionsaremadethatimpactriskacceptance,thereshouldberoutinesinplacetomakesureexperts onlegalandsecurityissueshaveachancetosharetheirperspectivesontheissue.
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APPENDIX Mind Maps of Findings
Figures4-7provideanoverviewofthemainfindingsfromthestudy,aswellaswhichsub-studies thefindingscomefrom. 
